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Abstract 
From RACs to Advisory Councils analyses the discourse of stakeholders engaged in Europe’s Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) in a tier of governance known as RACs (Regional Advisory Councils) from 2004 to 
2008.  The analysis demonstrates a shift towards discursive sharing by participating stakeholders.  This fostered 
inclusion but did not effect a redistribution of the power held by Europe’s inter-governmental institutions.  This 
more substantive change would require more, and more consistent, discursive consensus from stakeholders.  
With a reformed CFP for 2014, this paper considers the possibility of a future in which regional stakeholder-
based fisheries governance becomes a reality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has recently undergone a second 
significant reform.  From the time of its introduction in 1983, the CFP used quota [1-2] and 
fleet management [1] to deliver its objectives.   Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, despite the 
decline of key stocks – most famously cod – the Council of Ministers consistently ratcheted 
up stock total allowable catches (TACs) proposed by the Commission [2] and ratcheted down 
the Commission’s attempts to reduce the size of the fleet [1,3,4].  Subsidised fleet expansion, 
technical advancement, increased catches and stock decline were the result.   
 
In the years leading up to the last reform of the CFP in 2002, the scale of North Sea fisheries’ 
over-capacity and associated stock crises became more difficult to ignore.  With scientific 
evidence of serious overfishing mounting, the Commission’s quota and structural policy 
Highlights 
 NSRAC participants developed cooperative discourses 2004–2008. 
 But pre-existing conflicts undermined NSRAC׳s capacity to influence policy. 
 The new CFP will provide more opportunities to influence decision-makers. 
 Influence depends on consensus. Cooperative discourses are critical. 
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proposals became geared towards balancing fishing opportunities with fish availability, the 
‘precautionary approach’ became de rigueur and national politicians were more constrained 
than in the past when it came to inflating TACs and limiting fleet reductions.   
 
Despite this sea change, a general perception of governance failure [5] in European fisheries 
pervaded the 2002 reform process and, on paper at least, significant changes were made.  
Among them, the new CFP entailed legal provision for Regional Advisory Councils.  This 
new tier of governance aimed, inter alia, to enable the CFP to benefit from the knowledge of 
fishers and other marine stakeholders [6,7].  The first to be established in late 2004 was the 
North Sea RAC (NSRAC), followed by a RAC for Pelagic Stocks, North Western Waters, 
the Baltic Sea, High Seas/Long-distance fleet, South Western Waters and, finally, for the 
Mediterranean Sea [8,9].  
 
This paper first outlines the research methods used to gather and analyse the discourse of 
North Sea fisheries actors.  The relative power of actors engaged in North Sea fisheries 
governance is then discussed in two contexts: the discourse of NSRAC actors between 2004 
and 2008, where both cooperative and conflicting discourses can be found; and the potential 
for change offered by the new CFP, which will be active from 2014.  The paper concludes by 
considering what individual non-governmental agents and groups of agents engaged in the 
European fisheries policy process can hope to achieve in the future. 
 
2. Material and Methods 
 
The data and analysis presented in this paper are extracted from a large body of research 
conducted over six years – 2002-2008 [10].  This research included 103 semi-structured 
interviews with Dutch and UK “stakeholders” regarding the potential of ecosystem-based 
fisheries management in the North Sea [11,12].  Interviews were conducted either side of the 
2002 CFP reform.  Research also involved regular observation and participation in policy, 
industry and scientific meetings and conferences at different scales within the North Sea 
context: the North Sea Commission Fisheries Partnership (NSCFP), the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, fishermen’s and women in fisheries’ organisations 
and NSRAC.  Collectively, the data gathered constitutes a record of the conversation of the 
different sectors involved in fishing and fisheries governance in the North Sea from the time 
before the CFP reform until 2008.   
 
Data was organised by manual ‘coding’ [13].  Coding is designed to present a degree of order 
and organisation to the analytical process and the text under interrogation.   Data was broken 
down and channelled into common themes for analysis. Patterns in the data were searched 
for: regularities, variations, exceptions, differences, commonalities and connections between 
discursive comments and conversations.  A focus on “meaningful statements” subsequently 
narrowed the data field.  A statement was understood by the authors to have ‘meaning’ if (a) 
it was expressed in a considered way (intrinsic meaning); (b) if it was regarded by other 
actors as meaningful (extrinsic meaning); and (c) if it was relevant to the subject matter at 
hand (the nature of discourse in commercial North Sea fisheries and the location of power 
that that discourse reveals). 
 
Having used this process to identify the meaningful statements of research participants, the 
resulting discourse extracts were interrogated both in themselves and in relation to each other.  
Common and distinct features of the discursive extracts’ explicit meanings and underlying 
attitudes were drawn out.   Specific attention was paid to indicators of the relative power of 
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discursive extracts in terms of their impacts on human actors and institutional arrangements.  
In the next section, interactions between different actors within NSRAC and between 
NSRAC and the European Commission are discussed as part of an analysis of the location of 
power in North Sea fisheries governance.  In the following section, the implications of this 
analysis for sustainable fisheries governance are considered in the context of the 2014 CFP 
reform. 
 
3. Discourse Theory 
 
‘A certain fragility has been discovered in the very bedrock of existence.’ [14] 
 
Postmodern political thought emerged during the second half of the twentieth century in 
reaction against the dominance of positivist theories focused on the analysis of ‘social facts’ 
[15].  This school of thought allows for recognition of the multiplicity of truth(s) and of the 
inherent subjectivity of ‘social facts’.  Two key postmodern ideas underpin this paper.  First, 
discourses, the world views they perpetuate, and the meanings underpinning them, are both 
socially constructed and socially constitutive [16-18].  It is by discourse that we construct, 
convey and influence vision(s) of the world around us: ‘[The world is] constituted in one way 
or another as people talk it, write it and argue it.’ [19]; ‘Human beings socially construct their 
world, and it is through this construction – always precarious and incomplete – that they give 
to a thing its being’ [16].  There is a continually iterative relationship between discourse and 
society, society and discourse [10,20].  This relationship ensures that discourse is dynamic, 
rather than static, across time and space.  It is not a fixed ‘social fact’. 
 
Second, discourses can be both powerful and subjugated.  Perceiving discourses as socially 
constructed and constitutive indicates the potential for power to be wielded through them.  
Thanks to human influence, some discourses become metanarratives, holding hegemonic 
influence over the meaning(s) ascribed by society to a given set of issues.  Others become 
subjugated, silenced by metanarratives and their human champions, unless discursive 
insurrection occurs [14].  Insurrection occurs through criticism of metanarratives and can lead 
to their overthrow or transformation through the co-optation of previously excluded 
knowledges.  Discourse analysis, with its sensitivity to context, enables the study of relative 
power between different actors and their discourses.     
 
This paper contends that discourses are constructed by society or groups within society; that 
they can influence society; and that they can be powerful forces which can dominate societal 
meanings or can be overthrown by alternative critical discourses.  By analysing discourses 
over time and space, it is possible to see power and influence change hands.  As a way of 
managing the multiplicity of discourse, the authors of this paper use the term conversation.  
This encompasses the many discourses at play in European fisheries.  In practical terms, 
“conversation” is understood to include a wide scope of human communication: the spoken 
and written word [21-2], non-linguistic actions [16], visual images and silence [17].  All of 
these carry with them the communication of beliefs [22] and their contexts add meaning [23]. 
 
4. Results: From criticism to cooperation: discursive sharing in NSRAC 2004-2008 
 
‘Almost twenty years from its inceptions, the Common Fisheries Policy…has not 
delivered sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources and will need to be changed if 
it is to do so.’ [24] 
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The CFP was established as a centralised, hierarchical policy for managing European 
fisheries.  Policy was devised by the European Commission and decisions were brokered in 
the Fisheries Council by political compromise between Member States.  The findings of 
scientists from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) were used to 
underpin these decisions.   
 
In the years leading up to the 2002 CFP reform, a weakening of the policy machine’s 
stranglehold on European fisheries governance became apparent in the discourse.  An internal 
acknowledgement of failure was accompanied by a great upsurge in external criticism from 
stakeholder groups.  They demanded participation and sought change to ensure a sustainable 
future for industry and the marine environment.  DG Fisheries opened its doors to a 
programme of consultation with stakeholders [25].     
 
A key result of the lengthy consultation process for the 2002 CFP Reform was provision for 
RACs.  NSRAC was the first to be established in late 2004 [7] with a remit to provide 
consensus advice to the European Commission, requiring participants to collaborate.  
NSRAC’s Executive Committee was populated by organisations with an interest in North Sea 
fisheries: two thirds fishing industry organisations; one third ‘other organisations’, including 
environmental groups, consumer organisations and women in fisheries organisations [8].  
Scientists and representatives of Member States, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament could attend as observers. 
 
At NSRAC’s first meeting, in December 2004, it seemed likely that the Commission would 
be steering proceedings, setting agendas and timelines.  However, this was resisted by 
NSRAC members: ‘It’s very important that we at least establish the beginnings of a different 
way of doing things’ (National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations (NFFO) 
representative) [26].  NSRAC’s Executive Committee very quickly insisted that agendas 
should be agreed in advance.  The organisation began to develop its own policy ideas and 
negotiate its own timelines for advice delivery.   
 
Hatchard [10] presents a detailed analysis of themes in the discourse of NSRAC participants 
from the time of its inception in 2004.  Before the establishment of NSRAC, the loudest 
voices excluded from the mainstream discourse of the CFP were essentially polarised: 
industry representatives focused on the disaster of industry decline for fishermen and their 
communities; and the green lobby focused on environmental crisis and catastrophe.  Criticism 
of the failure of the CFP to deliver either socio-economic or environmental sustainability 
brought these two groups together for the first time.  Within NSRAC, a more diverse 
arrangement of actors built on this common ground to develop a cooperative discourse, which 
co-existed with their separate polarised discourses.  Evidence for this discursive duality 
within NSRAC can be found in cooperative projects and in conflicts over fishing 
opportunities. 
 
4.1 Cooperative discourse 
 
A new cross-cutting discourse emerged in the shared conversation space provided by 
NSRAC.  Taking on board elements from all sectors – science, industry, environmentalism, 
community and governance – enabled diverse actors to communicate and collaborate.  Three 
issues of interest to NSRAC members illustrate this cooperative discourse: marine spatial 
planning, socio-economic assessment and long-term fisheries management.  NSRAC sub-
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groups were established on each of these issues in its first year, with members drawn from 
NSRAC’s Executive Committee.  
 
The Spatial Planning Working Group was established at the behest of environmental interests 
to address fisheries’ lack of explicit ownership rights over the sea, which disadvantages them 
in the competition for access to the sea.  This problem is compounded by the migration of 
fish stocks, which makes fishermen unwilling to agree to spatial restrictions on their activities 
which may prevent future fishing opportunities: 
 
‘Lack of individual ownership (unlike on land) means that there is not much (if any) 
compensation: generally  it’s  free  to  tell  fishermen  to  go  somewhere  else.  
Whereas other industries have ownership/exclusive rights on their installations.  If 
that’s the case then the rest should be designated as ‘belonging’ to the fishing industry 
and any further changes should be negotiated.’ 
(Danmarks Fiskeriforening representative) [27] 
 
The green lobby’s response to this call to arms was remarkably positive: ‘[There is a] lack of 
a sense of urgency to start work on spatial planning.  Industries need to send a very strong 
message that something must be done…[We] urge fishermen to think ahead, rather than act 
as victims’ (Seas at Risk representative) [27].  This reflects a change in approach that Dunn 
[28] charts in environmental non-governmental organisations with an interest in fisheries: a 
move from occasional ‘whistle blowers’ in the 1980s to part of the ‘problem solving process’ 
in the twenty-first century. 
 
As a result of this shared awareness, environmental and fisheries representatives cooperated 
in NSRAC’s Spatial Planning Working Group to map North Sea fishing effort.  It was hoped 
that this would give fisheries a better platform from which to negotiate conflicts with other 
marine users, such as shipping, oil and gas extraction, aggregate dredging, sub-sea cables, 
and more latterly wind farms.  The strength of the collaborative discourse between fishermen 
and environmental organisations was illustrated in 2007 when environmental representatives 
facilitated a meeting between fishing industry representatives, scientists and the offshore 
windfarm lobby [29].  At this meeting, environmental NSRAC members did not take a 
combative green position advocating windfarms at all costs.  Instead, the discussion focused 
on best practice of how to manage the conflict between the two industries.  The suggestion 
here is that environmentalists could play the role of facilitators in helping NSRAC and its 
members engage with non-fisheries actors in environmental debates about ‘blue space’. 
 
At the same time, a collaborative discourse was developing around the theme of socio-
economics.  Many fishermen, policy-makers, scientists and environmentalists agreed that 
socio-economics is important in North Sea fisheries and that this subject was not given 
sufficient analytical attention in the policy process.  For example, fishermen spoke of 
introducing a ‘socio-economic precautionary approach’ (Danmarks Fiskeriforening 
representative) [26]; policy-makers called for ‘balance’ between  environmental,  economic  
and  social  aspects  of  fishing; and scientists and environmentalists acknowledged the 
negative socio-economic implications of reducing fishing pressure in the North Sea.  This 
shared perception crystallised under the leadership of the North Sea Women’s Network 
around the idea of socio-economic impact assessments.    
 
NSRAC’s socio-economic sub-group envisaged that NSRAC would work with DG 
Fisheries’ Economic Analysis Unit (EAU) to  establish clear social and economic objectives 
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for North Sea fisheries and their governance [30]: ‘…fisheries management needs overall 
socio-economic aims/objectives and…the RAC should be a means of setting those 
objectives.’ (fisheries economist) [31].  To tackle this, the socio-economic sub-group 
drafted an internal NSRAC protocol requiring the organisation to consider social and 
economic issues in all its decision-making processes and conducted two phases of research 
regarding the use of socio-economic information in the policy-making process [10,32,33].  
 
Common ground was established within the sub-group prioritising socio-economic 
analysis: ‘It’s very sensible to have this [socio-economics] in the advice process’ (Green 
lobby representative) [34]; ‘…members  of  the  RAC  already  think  about  socio-
economics,  so  the  protocol  would  not  mean additional work; it will merely formalise the 
issue’ (Shetland Fishermen’s Association representative) [31]; ‘We should consider the 
relations between the fisheries policy and the markets and advise the Commission on this’ 
(European Fish Traders and Processors Organisation representative) [35].   
 
There was support for socio-economic analysis from the wider NSRAC membership: ‘Every 
week socio-economic arguments arise – we now have the chance to deal with them…this is 
vital’ (Deutscher Fischereiverband representative) [36]; and ‘A strong argument in favour of 
RACs is to introduce a real social and economic dimension.’ (NFFO representative) [36].  
However, concerns were expressed about the limits of NSRAC’s expertise and capacity to 
give socio-economic issues due attention: datasets for many social issues are unavailable and 
much economic data is commercially sensitive.  In addition, many industry representatives 
took the view that socio-economics was not NSRAC’s responsibility:  
 
‘I’m very strongly in favour of having socio-economic elements to our thinking about 
the advice we have out forward.   But…it is an abdication of responsibility.  We 
should insist that impact assessments are done by the Commission.  They’ve got a 
responsibility to do it.’ 
(NFFO representative) [34] 
 
‘Member States disagree about socio-economics…Women in fisheries are always 
talking about the impact of measures on the personal income…But when you move 
higher up it gets more complicated…It’s up to the Council to include socio-economic 
considerations in their deliberations.  Instead, maybe we should think of the RAC 
trying to use economics as a tool in fisheries management.’  
(Productschap Vis (PVIS) representative) [34]  
 
Despite these concerns, the Executive Committee approved the sub-group’s socio-economic 
protocol and supported its subsequent research programme, indicating a significant level of 
support for the objectives pursued by NSWN among other members of NSRAC and a 
measure of symmetry between their discourses on the subject of socio-economics. 
 
The third issue illustrating cooperative discourse within NSRAC is long-term fisheries 
management.   A political commitment exists in the CFP to a long-term management system 
based on a harvest control rule (HCR) linked to MSY: ‘MSY [does not replace the 
precautionary approach.   It] marks the transition from a risk avoidance strategy to a be 
productive strategy…Let’s get beyond just keeping out of trouble to having productive 
fisheries’ (European Commission representative) [37].  This manifested itself in recovery 
plans for crisis stocks where a target was set for maximum sustainable fishing mortality 
(F). However, MSY as a concept for setting limits on catches was rejected by many of 
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NSRAC’s fishing industry representatives as ‘too simplistic’ (NFFO Representative) [34].  It 
was criticised particularly because: ‘You can’t have MSY for all the species of the 
ecosystem at the same time’ (Danmarks Fiskeriforening representative) [37].  Thus, MSY 
was perceived as yet another vehicle for protecting iconic species, such as North Sea cod: 
‘MSY is associated by fishermen with the Commission’s emphasis on saving particular 
stocks’ [38-40]. 
  
However, NSRAC members shared strong support for a long-term management approach, 
which would move fisheries management away from the problematic annual haggle over 
fishing opportunities for the year ahead.  Fisheries representatives cited both ecological and 
economic reasons for taking such an approach: ‘…management takes place in a changing 
ecosystem context…The prize  if  we  get  this  right  is  considerable…a  move  towards  
more  stable  fisheries  and  ultimately profitable fisheries’ (NFFO representative) [38].  
NSRAC proceeded to commission research into alternative forms of long-term fisheries 
management.  In the place of MSY, which fixes a target for F, the research advocated a 
case-by-case approach to take account of the diversity of fisheries in the North Sea [38].  
Thus, NSRAC made a commitment to the idea of directional change, which would be 
measured via indicators linked to four principles of sustainability: social, economic, 
institutional and biological [39]. To move forward with this, in 2006, development groups 
were established within NSRAC to consider long-term planning for several species and 
groups of species: saithe, monkfish, Nephrops, whitefish (cod, haddock and whiting) and 
flatfish (plaice and sole).   
 
When NSRAC members cooperated in this way and sought their own scientific advice, 
tension was created between NSRAC, the Commission and scientific experts of different 
kinds.  Instead of harnessing NSRAC’s consensus support for long-term management, the 
Commission alienated them by persisting with their MSY agenda.  At the same time, the 
pressure from the recovery status of some stocks – particularly cod and plaice – meant that 
NSRAC was drawn into a debate with the Commission on the subject of MSY.  This 
diverted NSRAC’s time and attention away from the development of non-MSY related 
long-term management objectives, thereby limiting their influence to a Commission-driven 
agenda, rather than their own.  Despite this, NSRAC showed considerable commitment in 
developing a long-term management plan for Nephrops, still under development [41], and 
which has yet to be taken up by the Commission. 
 
4.2 Discursive conflict 
 
Despite this evidence of emergent cooperative discourses on particular issues, the pre-
existing rift between the fishing industry and environmental organisations persisted.  This rift 
was most obvious during annual December negotiations on quotas and fishing effort for the 
subsequent year. Between 2004 and 2008, the two sets of organisations consistently failed to 
find common ground.  For example, in NSRAC’s Demersal Working Group at the end of 
2006, fishing industry representatives advocated a rollover of the cod quota and effort 
arrangements from 2006.  Environmental representatives would not support this.  Nor would 
they accept an industry-only position to be put forward by NSRAC.  Since a compromise 
position could not be found, the matter was dropped by NSRAC.  The very real potential for 
total breakdown between partners within NSRAC was apparent from the following 
discussion: 
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‘WWF representative: It is undesirable to send a letter just from the fishing industry 
members.  Because stocks are so dire, we can’t sign up to it. 
Danmarks Fiskeriforening representative: The situation is not dire…Let’s cancel the 
disaster and announce it some other day. 
CEFAS Scientist: If you have a rollover of the TAC, you will still have to reduce 
effort, because there’s more fish out there. 
NFFO representative: Stop crying wolf.  Just get on board and give us some 
assistance.  Please just give us give us some support.  We want to survive. 
EAFPA Representative: If industry want to send a letter, there are alternative 
platforms instead of undermining the future of the RAC.’ 
[42] 
 
Conflict also erupted over recovery plans for ‘crisis stocks’.  In 2004, an industry-driven 
proposal was developed by the Interim RAC Working Group for Flatfish ‘to implement a 
multi-annual management strategy over the next five years, closely tailored to the needs of 
the different fisheries’ [43].  ENGOs challenged the proposed text on the grounds that it was 
not ‘precautionary’ enough: ‘Consensus should not override sense and cause a situation in 
which the objectives are not met’ (Seas at Risk representative) [35].  Environmental 
representatives proposed that further attention should be paid to four factors: reductions in 
discarding; a greater degree of effort reduction than the proposed 15% cut; multi-annual 
TACs; and the poor availability of data [43]. In this case the conflict was resolved when a 
three year review process for the plan was agreed.   
 
A third source of conflict emerged in the dialogue between environmental and industry 
representatives regarding environmental campaigns pursued outside NSRAC.  In some 
instances, this was not perceived to be a problem: for example, Birdlife International and 
Seas at Risk [44] lobbied the North Sea Ministerial Meeting on the subject of the 
implementation of an ecosystem-based approach to North Sea fisheries management.  
However, in other instances,  environmental campaigns were perceived by other NSRAC 
members to be contrary to their stakeholder role and the ‘consensus’ ethos of NSRAC: for 
example, a WWF Netherlands “consumer awareness” campaign disseminated a traffic-light 
style score-card of human consumption fish species according to stock health, impacts on 
target and non-target species and habitats and the management system, which listed all North 
Sea commercial species as yellow or red, rather than green.  NSRAC fishing industry 
members were not given advance warning of this campaign and they perceived it as directly 
counter to the cooperative objectives of NSRAC:  
 
‘The Dutch sector had no input in the grading…I feel that…you don’t help fishermen 
– those parts of the sector that want to fish more sustainably – if you lower prices….I 
don’t know if the effect of this campaign is dramatic.   I don’t know how our 
fishermen will react to this campaign in the coming months, and whether they will ask 
if we want to sit together with WWF and Seas at Risk any more. There’s a lot of 
uncertainty about what will happen next.”  
(PVIS representative) [37] 
 
For their part, environmental representatives maintained that the assessment underpinning the 
campaign was extensively peer-reviewed and that the fishing industry did not have a high 
enough take-up of more selective, responsible and sustainable fishing practices [42].  This 
controversy served to undermine environmental representatives’ relationships with other 
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NSRAC stakeholders for some time and unravelled much of the progress that had been made 
towards acting as partners since the organisation’s establishment.   
 
This conflict, and discussions over fishing opportunities and management and recovery plans, 
illustrated the explicit prioritisation of environmental objectives over socio-economic ones by 
environmental organisations, despite their engagement with their NSRAC colleagues over a 
role for spatial planning and socio-economic data in fisheries governance. By contrast, 
fisheries representatives, although displaying a degree of agreement with other NSRAC 
participants on long-term issues and policies, continued to resist policy change and to 
challenge associated scientific advice.  This persistent discursive tension made the provision 
of consensus advice to the Commission harder to achieve, thereby further reducing NSRAC’s 
opportunities to influence fisheries policy. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Power and influence of NSRAC 
 
The establishment of NSRAC presented an opportunity for actors outside the hierarchical 
management framework constituted by the CFP to engage in the policy process.  A 
prerequisite for influence was that the members of NSRAC’s Executive Committee provided 
advice with consensual support.   NSRAC’s members worked hard to find common ground 
and achieved some consensus in developing long-term policy positions on issues such as 
spatial planning, socio-economics and long-term fisheries management.  However, 
NSRAC’s success at influencing the policy process on these issues was limited.  For 
example, social issues remained sidelined in the policy debate and were not underpinned by 
scientific datasets.  Instead, the Commission continued to drive the agenda and determined 
which policy options were on the table.  MSY provides a clear example of this.  NSRAC’s 
position that a non-MSY long-term management approach would be more effective for 
achieving broad spectrum sustainability has still not been taken up by the Commission.    
 
At the same time, the perpetuation of familiar conflicts within NSRAC often made the 
provision of consensus advice difficult to achieve, particularly where there was polarisation 
between industry and environmental positions.  Thus, although the emergent collaborative 
discourse within NSRAC illustrated the potential of participative governance in fisheries to 
bridge the discourse gap between diverse stakeholder groups, this new shared discourse of 
consensus was not paralleled by a reduction in pre-existing polarising discourses and was 
unsuccessful in influencing the Commission to any significant degree.   
 
These findings broadly reflect the findings of a survey of participants from four RACs [45] 
conducted in 2009.  On the one hand, the survey found NSRAC respondents evenly split on 
whether NSRAC had impacted policy ‘very little’ or ‘somewhat’.  No respondents believed 
that fisheries policy had been ‘greatly impacted’ by NSRAC.  This finding may explain why 
20-30% of participants from across the RACs felt a decrease in trust towards the European 
Commission.  On the other hand, the survey did find an increase in trust and understanding 
between industry and conservation RAC participants, which parallels our finding of an 
emergent cooperative discourse. 
 
The end of 2008 found North Sea fisheries actors engaged in a familiar debate: how much 
should fishing effort be adjusted in 2009 to accommodate the state of the stocks?  ICES 
recommended closing the cod fishery to aid stock rebuilding.  The Commission, in turn, 
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proposed twenty five per cent reductions in quota and fishing effort on recovery stocks, 
including cod.  The Council of Ministers agreed on the twenty five per cent cut in quota, but 
cut fishing days by only ten per cent, with skippers to be rewarded with more days for 
conservation measures.  In response, the industry expressed cautious optimism, while 
ENGOs spoke of the deal as having gambled with the future cod stocks.   
 
Thus, when it came to immediate decision-making, NSRAC’s hard-won cooperative 
discourse was defeated by pre-existing conflicts.  Without further institutional change to the 
decision-making process facilitating a more genuinely long-term approach, work towards 
stakeholder consensus could make little headway.  Nevertheless, NSRAC’s cooperative 
discourse can still be interpreted as representing a potential challenge to the pre-existing 
hierarchical discourse.   
 
To return to Foucault, NSRAC offers a unique window on a rapid process of discursive 
change.  Foucault’s conceptualisation of the insurrection of subjugated discourses and 
associated knowledges is highly relevant to the contemporary fisheries context in the North 
Sea where a trend has been established since the reform of the CFP of enabling some 
previously excluded actors to have a public voice.  Foucault’s identification of scientific 
knowledges as having historically had hegemonic status is particularly apt for the fisheries 
context where science has been granted a dominant position in the governance of fisheries 
and the actors associated with it, and where other traditional knowledges were consistently 
excluded under the pre-2002 CFP.  Post-2002 CFP provision for a degree of participative 
governance galvanised NSRAC actors from previously polarised sectors to develop a 
cooperative counter-discourse.  Between 2004 and 2008, this failed to displace the hegemonic 
discourse.  However, 2014 will see the realisation of another round of reform for the CFP.   
 
5.2 2014: The new CFP 
 
Provision for RACs under the 2002 CFP reform incentivised cooperative discourse between 
diverse fisheries actors.  However the 2002 reforms did not alter the CFP’s decision-making 
structure, thereby limiting RACs’ influence on policy.  The latest phase of CFP reform is due 
to come to fruition in a new policy for 2014.  In this section, relevant changes to the CFP are 
summarised and their implications for the distribution of power in future fisheries 
governance considered in the light of the discourse analysis of NSRAC. 
 
Within its CFP reform proposals, the European Commission proposed new terms for RACs 
[46]: ‘Based on existing experience, the Commission envisages to maintain and extend the 
role of the Advisory Councils in advising on conservation policy under the regionalisation 
model’ [46,47].  The role of Advisory Councils (heretofore RACs) was somewhat vague in 
these proposals.  After extensive negotiation, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament came to political agreement in May 2013 and the Council formally adopted the 
new CFP basic regulation in October 2013 [48].      
 
Under the terms of the new CFP [48], there will be eleven Advisory Councils (seven former 
RACs, and four new councils for the outermost regions, aquaculture, markets and the Black 
Sea).  They will continue to work on a consensus model of decision-making and to draw 
their members from the fisheries sector (60%) and other interest groups (40%) – contrary to 
a European Parliament proposal to level the playing field to 50:50 [49].  Their structure, 
therefore, is broadly unchanged.  They will have access to European finance as 
‘organisations pursuing an aim of general European interest’.   
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The role of Advisory Councils remains to provide ‘consensus advice’ to the Commission and 
Member States on regulations, problems and solutions.  They can do this independently, 
without invitation, and recipients will be required to respond within two months.  Where this 
is the case, ‘their advice shall be taken into account’ and, if not followed, reasons will need 
to be given.  However, the new CFP cements a two-way relationship between RACs, on the 
one hand, and Member States and the Commission on the other by requiring the latter to 
notify and consult the former on any change in management rules.  If any Member State 
seeks to introduce conservation measures, they must advise Advisory Councils of their 
intentions and their rationale.  Where action is urgent, Advisory Councils will have a 7 day 
response period; there will be a minimum of a month’s consultation for non-urgent measures 
affecting other Member State fleets.  Despite the new provision for funding, tight timeframes 
for advice provision and responses to proposals may still weigh heavily on the Advisory 
Councils whose human and financial resources are stretched [50].   
 
More dramatically, the newly agreed CFP includes provision for a weak interpretation of 
regionalisation of fisheries management [51].  Listing regionalisation as a principle of good 
governance alongside ‘appropriate involvement of stakeholders’, the new CFP regulation 
enables Member States in defined geographical areas to submit joint recommendations to the 
Commission for achieving conservation measures, predominantly within the confines of 
multi-annual management plans.  As a part of this, article 18 [48] explicitly adds to the role 
of Advisory Councils by introducing an element of compulsion:  the regulation requires that 
Member States with a direct management interest shall consult the relevant Advisory 
Councils and do so within defined timelines.   
 
This strengthening of the role of Advisory Councils was not so explicit in the Commission’s 
proposal [46].  Amendments agreed by the European Parliament [49] (for example, 
requirements to explain why advice is not being followed) and the Council of Ministers [52] 
(particularly timeframes for communication) have ensured prescribed relationships of advice 
and information between Advisory Councils and the Commission and between Advisory 
Councils and Member States.  Thus, negotiation between the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament has ensured that the new Advisory Councils are to be more explicitly 
placed in the policy-making process and to have more access to information than they did as 
RACs.   
 
Thus, a confluence between the Parliament and the Council of Ministers on the subject of 
extending the role of RACs under their new ‘Advisory Council’ guise has ensured that the 
renamed bodies will be, broadly speaking, consulted, rather than notified by the Commission 
and Member States under the new CFP.  This change assigns increased responsibilities to 
former RACs.  However, entrenching these stakeholder bodies in the policy process in this 
way will not necessarily increase their influence.  Rather than being required to take 
Advisory Councils’ advice, the Commission and Member States will merely have to account 
for the times when they do not take that advice: this could happen every time.  Thus, one 
potential outcome of the reform is that Advisory Councils will not be listened to and that 
their heavier workload may serve to re-alienate stakeholders already under strain under the 
old system. 
 
Overall, the reform seems to deliver something of what NSRAC wanted: ‘…in a reformed 
CFP RACs should have a major role to play – not only with the Commission but 
increasingly at a regional level through engagement with Member State authorities and 
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fisheries scientists in the design and implementation of policies…’ [50].  In the new system, 
stakeholders, through Advisory Councils, would no longer be bypassed by the relationship 
between Commission bureaucrats and Member State politicians.  This may entail more 
influence for stakeholders and more accountability of Member States and the Commission in 
taking decisions.   
 
6. Conclusion – the next CFP: a home for participatory fisheries governance? 
 
This paper has applied discourse analysis to elicit insights relating to participatory European 
fisheries governance.  The findings demonstrate that discursive interaction can facilitate the 
emergence of new cooperative discourses between previously polarised groups.  Advisory 
Councils’ new consultative relationship with the Commission and Member States will embed 
regional stakeholders more effectively into the policy process, increasing the influencing 
opportunities of those actors who, before the 2002 reform, were excluded from the policy 
process.  
 
However, the discourse analysis of NSRAC presented in the first half of this paper 
demonstrates that institutional change is not sufficient to overcome divisions between diverse 
actors; discursive change is also required.  Thus, progress achieved within NSRAC towards 
the development of a cooperative, consensual discourse will need to be continued in the new 
North Sea Advisory Council.  This progress will be challenged by the new responsibilities 
and associated workload of the organisation which the 2014 reform will impose on it.  
Participants will need to agree more, and agree more quickly, than in the past, and to do this, 
a common discourse is required.  Further, the Commission and Member States will also need 
to demonstrate a commitment to listen to Advisory Council advice.   
 
In the longer term, if these two prerequisites are met – discursive consensus and external 
institutional acceptance – a more successful and wider cooperative discourse may emerge 
between Advisory Councils, Members States and the Commission.  Thus, the strengthening 
of relationships between actors may be converted into actual influence for stakeholders.  
Given their knowledge and expertise, this influence could be used to achieve real 
improvements in the biological, ecological and socio-economic sustainability of Europe’s 
fisheries at the regional scale. 
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